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Abstract 
During the violence following the 2007 presidential election in Kenya, it has been 
reported that around 1,000 people were killed and over 500,000 people were displaced. 
In this paper, we investigate the root causes of the violence by using a panel survey of 
295 rural households living Rift Valley and Nyanza Provinces, where the violence took 
place. Among our sample households, 11 percent of male members and 9 percent of 
female members were victims of the violence, 11 percent of households were displaced, 
and 23 percent of households hosted at least one internally displaced person. The results 
show that certain ethnic groups had higher probabilities of being victims of the violence. 
In addition, we find that members of households without land titles were victimized 
more than those with land titles, but they were less likely to leave their homes. They 
could be victimized because the mobs wanted to chase them away, but they hesitated to 
leave their homes, knowing that it would be difficult for them to retain their land 
without land titles. The land issue was clearly one of the root causes of the violence, and 
the issue should be solved or at least addressed to prevent similar conflicts in the future.  
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Haki Yetu (It’s Our Right): Determinants of Post-Election Violence in 
Kenya
1
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following the presidential election in December 2007, people who were not 
satisfied with the election results resorted to violence. Attacks targeting certain ethnic 
groups induced revenge attacks, resulting in over two months of civil unrest throughout 
Kenya. Almost one thousand people have been reported killed and around 500,000 
people were internally displaced due to the post-election violence (PEV) (Human Rights 
Watch, 2008). Many experts had anticipated election-related ethnic conflicts would 
occur in Kenya because ethnic clashes have become a common phenomenon during and 
after the presidential elections since 1992 when the first election under the multi-party 
system was held (Kimenyi and Ndung’u, 2005). 
Although the trigger of the violence is clearly the presidential election in 2007, 
there are various hypotheses as to its root causes. The first hypothesis is that the 
violence was caused by power struggle among ethnic groups. The 2007 presidential 
election was in essence a contest between the incumbent President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, 
and the opposition candidate Odinga, of Luo origin, each of whom involved different 
ethnic groups to form a coalition for the election campaign. One of the central issues 
during the election was devolution or decentralization.
2
 On one hand, Odinga 
represented the voice of the smaller ethnic groups that have felt marginalized by the 
                                                   
1
 During the post-election violence, the mobs who supported the defeated presidential candidate 
Odinga chanted “Haki Yetu (It’s our right),” denouncing the election results (Commission of 
Inquiry on Post Election Violence, 2008). 
2 There are 3 broad categories of decentralization: devolution, delegation, and deconcentration 
(Sasaoka, 2005). The so-called decentralization policies that have been implemented in Kenya 
in the past (such as that of District Focus for Rural Development or Local Authority Transfer 
Fund) are mainly financial decentralization resulting in mere “deconcentration.” It is often 
seen that political devolution, therefore, has not yet been achieved in Kenya (Crook, 2003; 
Sasaoka, 2005). 
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central government and yearned for devolution of power. On the other hand, President 
Kibaki represented the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, and others who favored a 
strong centralized system (Nguyen, 2007; Gibson and Long, 2009). Thus, post-election 
violence can be considered as part of the power struggle between these two groups. 
Another hypothesis is that the violence was motivated by land conflicts. Rift Valley 
Province, where the violence occurred most prevalently, is also a land that was once 
owned largely by the White settlers during the British colonial era but then allocated to 
indigenous people and immigrants at the independence. Therefore, the seeds of the land 
conflicts had been existed between the indigenous Kalenjin and Maasai people and the 
immigrants, notably the Kikuyu since independence (Kimenyi and Ndung’u, 2005). If 
the root cause of the violence is land related, then the risk of future incidence of 
violence will never be abated lest the land dispute is resolved. If it is solely on the 
devolution of political power, then the devolution will abate the future conflicts. To 
prevent incidences similar to the 2007 PEV, it is vital that the root cause of the violence 
is identified and relevant policies are put in place.  
The purpose of this paper is to determine the root causes of the post-election 
violence using household level panel data. Prior to the 2007 PEV, about 800 rural 
households in central and western regions of Kenya were interviewed twice in a panel 
survey (Yamano et al., 2005). Then, in March 2009, one year after the 2007 PEV, we 
re-interviewed 275 households that were part of the panel survey and were originally 
located in Rift Valley Province and the adjacent Nyanza Province. If they were still 
internally displaced at the time of the 2009 interview, we found and interviewed them at 
their relocated areas. As a result, we find that about 10 percent of the household 
members have been victims of the violence, 11 percent of the households were 
internally displaced, and 23 percent of them hosted at least one internally displaced 
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person. In the analyses below, we estimate the determinants of becoming a victim, being 
displaced, and hosting displaced people to identify root causes of the 2007 PEV.  
The organization of the paper is as follows:  first, section 2 explains the 
background to the 2007 presidential election and the violence that ensued as well as its 
relation to land dispute; in section 3, data and simple descriptive statistics are 
introduced; in section 4, regression model and variables are explained; section 5 
discusses the results; and the last section concludes with policy implications. 
 
2. History of Violence in Kenya 
2.1 The 2007 Presidential Election and PEV 
 In the presidential election that was held on December 27
th
, 2007, the main 
contestants were the incumbent President Kibaki and candidate Odinga. These two 
candidates had previously cooperated under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
and, in the presidential election in 2002, together won against candidate Kenyatta who 
was backed by the then Moi administration. Within NARC, the following agreements 
had been reached as conditions for appointing Kibaki as a presidential candidate for the 
2002 election (Daily Nation, October 23
rd
, 2002): (1) divide the cabinet posts equally 
between the Democratic Party (DP) group which was led by Kibaki and the other group 
which was led by Odinga, (2) set up a new constitution and devolve to prime minister 
part of the authority that the president held under the existing constitution, and (3) 
support Mr. Odinga to be elected as the prime minister.  
However, as the new government was formed, the process of cabinet formation 
and constitutional reform faced constant delay, and the relationship between the camps 
under NARC started to fall apart. The existing constitution, which had been written at 
the time of independence from the British, gives the Kenyan president significant power 
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initially designed to overcome obstacles for the newly created country. During the 
presidential campaign for the 2002 election, NARC pleaded to devolve certain 
presidential power to other posts and regional governments. However, the “new” 
constitution proposal, which was drafted under a close supervision of the newly elected 
president Kibaki, failed to devolve much of the presidential power. The draft was 
eventually vetoed by the disillusioned public in the referendum of 2005, greatly 
undermining public support for President Kibaki. Meanwhile, Odinga newly formed the 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and continued to gain support throughout the 
country by setting up the Pentagon or a political partnership among regional politicians 
from not only Nyanza Province where he comes from but also from the Western, Rift 
Valley, Eastern, and Coastal Provinces. The significance of this partnership was that it 
was not those politicians in the Central Province where capital Nairobi is situated, but 
the regional provinces that strongly desired political decentralization that agreed to side 
with Odinga.  
Against this background, the two former allies contested for presidency in the 
2007 election. Furthermore, the two candidates represented not only their own ethnic 
groups, but also other ethnic groups that were pulled in to each camp, thus polarizing 
the political support along the ethnic line. The resulting voting pattern as surveyed in an 
exit poll, described in Gibson and Long (2009), is shown in Appendix Table A1. The 
countrywide exit poll randomly selected polling stations and surveyed 5,495 randomly 
selected voters. The sampling was proportionate to population size in each region. 
According to this exit poll, 94 percent of Kikuyu voters voted for Kibaki (who is 
Kikuyu), 98 percent of Luo voters voted for Odinga (Luo), and 86 percent of Kamba 
voters voted for the third candidate Musyoka (Kamba). None of the candidates can 
reach a simple majority from their own ethnic group as Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba 
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consists only 23 percent, 13 percent, and 10 percent respectively of the population.
3
 
The candidates needed supports from other ethnic groups. For example, both Kibaki and 
Odinga fielded a vice president candidate from the Luhya tribe, the largest among the 
remaining ethnic groups, in order to attract Luhya votes (Gibson and Long, 2009). As a 
result, 75% of the Luhya voted for Odinga and 23% for Kibaki. Odinga, in addition, 
succeeded in acquiring regional support and gained 88% of votes from the Kalenjin 
people, to which the previous President Moi belonged. Among other smaller ethnic 
groups, the Kisii and Maasai took neutral stand. 
Under this intense competition, the exit poll predicted Odinga to be slightly in 
the lead for the presidential seat. The exit poll suggests that Odinga have won the seat 
registering 46.1 percent of total votes against Kibaki’s 40.2 percent. Allowing for 
sampling error of ±1.32% points, Odinga’s victory could be established with statistical 
significance. In fact, the parliamentary election that was conducted at the same time as 
the presidential election, Odinga’s ODM won against President Kibaki’s Party of 
National Unity (PNU) by a large margin. However, in the evening of December 30
th
, 
three days after the voting, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) reported that 
Kibaki won 46.4 percent and Odinga 44.1 percent of total votes (Appendix Table A1). 
Immediately after this announcement, violence broke out in Nairobi slums and other 
major cities and soon developed into a series of attacks throughout the country, quickly 
worsening the public order that was not to be restored for over two months (Commission 
of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, 2008; Human Right Watch, 2008). 
Initially, the main targets of the violence were the Kikuyu people, to which 
President Kibaki belonged. They were attacked in various spots including Kibera Slum 
                                                   
3 Ethnic composition of the entire population and that of Table 1 may not be exactly the same 
as recent censuses do not report ethnic composition. However, as the sampling is carried out 
randomly proportionate to population size in each region, we can say that they are largely 
comparable.  
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of Nairobi, in the city of Kisumu of Nyanza Province, and locations in Coastal Province 
that are inhabited by Kikuyu and Luo people. In Rift Valley Province, not only 
spontaneous attacks but also more systematic raids, mainly organized by groups of 
Kalenjin origin, occurred (Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, 2008). The 
difference between violence that occurred in Rift Valley and other places is that the 
politicians in Rift Valley have been said to deliberately fuel the land dispute between the 
different ethnic groups in order to win more public support during the election 
campaign. Human Right Watch (2008) reports that several of Kalenjin politicians spread 
words to make their people believe that once ODM occupied the presidential office, 
they would be able to make the Kikuyu leave the province and would redistribute the 
land among indigenous ethnic groups. Thus, in this particular province, the violence 
could be highly related to land dispute, resulting in violence of a more serious scale and 
consequences. The following sub-section describes the land issue in the Rift Valley in 
more detail.  
 
2.2 Violence and Land Dispute  
At independence from the British rule, the new Kenyan government 
redistributed land that had been previously owned by white settlers. The fact that part of 
the lands were given to immigrants is often cited as a cause of the land conflict in the 
Rift Valley Province (Daudeline, 2002; Kimenyi and Ndung’u, 2005). Before 
colonization, land was managed by communities and allocated to households as seen fit 
by them. No land certificates were issued, but the user rights were recognized and 
protected as such by community members. Ignoring the existence of such unwritten 
land rights, the colonial government appropriated the most fertile plots of land in Kenya 
that summed to 2.8 million hectares and gave them to white settlers (Kimenyi and 
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Ndung’u, 2005). The Kikuyu people who had lived in populated White Highlands in the 
Central Province moved as farm workers to relatively large scale farms in the Rift 
Valley White Highlands. The Luo and Luhya that had inhabited the Western Province 
also immigrated to the Rift Valley in pursuit of better employment.  
The situation became more complex in Rift Valley when, at independence, the 
land redistribution program covered not only the Kalenjin people, who were the 
indigenous to the land, but extended to the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya people who had 
moved to the land as farm labor.
4
 There is also a view that the Kikuyu people were 
given preferential treatment in the redistribution due to ethnic attachment of the first 
President Kenyatta and many others Kikuyu officers who occupied high posts in the 
government. In the early days of independence, however, when people were still 
celebrating and in high hopes for the future and when land was in relative abundance, 
land issue was not considered as a serious problem. As the economy remained stagnant 
and the expanding rural population halved the per capita landholding from 0.46 hectare 
in 1960 to 0.23 hectare in 1990 (Jayne et al., 2003), increased demand for land led to 
more frequent land related disputes.  
Nonetheless, violence as an expression of discontent from such land disputes 
becomes discernible only after almost 30 years since the independence in 1963. The 
first incident of violence between the ethnic groups was reported in the year prior to the 
1992 presidential election. Then, violence is repeatedly reported at every presidential 
election. Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005) report the causes and consequences of the past 
conflicts in our sample districts of Rift Valley and Nyanza Provinces (Appendix Table 
A2). They show that violence happened just before and after the presidential elections 
                                                   
4 Whether Kalenjin people actually controlled the land before colonization is questionable. The 
name, “Kalenjin,” itself is said to be a dialect version of the opening words of a radio broadcast 
speech that called for volunteers to fight in World War II, ”I tell you, I tell you,” in Rift Valley 
region (Collier, 2009 pp69). 
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and are more prevalent in regions where a high percentage of land is alienated to 
immigrants and that the clashes are between the indigenous and immigrant ethnic 
groups. Apart from Rift Valley Province, violence has occurred in slums around Nairobi 
and Coastal areas where immigrants live in significant numbers. Another common 
characteristic of these places is that various ethnic groups live side by side and that the 
fear or feel of antagonism towards the “other” ethnic group may escalate very quickly in 
times of election campaigns that are highly tuned on ethnic lines. In this sense, some 
argue that the violent clashes between the ethnic groups during the PEV were nothing 
more than a political contest, and that land disputes are rather irrelevant.
5
 If such a view 
is a true reflection of the PEV, then the root cause of the problem will not be weeded 
away even if land dispute is resolved. Instead, political resolution should be sought. In 
order to identify the root cause of the PEV and draw relevant policy implications, we 
need to identify root causes of the PEV.  
  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. Data 
In this paper, we use panel data of 295 households from Rift Valley and Nyanza 
Provinces in Kenya (Table 1). These households are sub samples of 800 households that 
participated in the 2004 and 2007 surveys as part of the Research on Poverty, 
Environment, and Agricultural Technology Project (RePEAT).
6
 The original panel data 
did not anticipate the PEV, but were collected for analyses on agricultural production 
                                                   
5
 For instance, Member of Parliament Ruto from the Rift Valley is reported to have said: “The 
issue of the PEV is not land… Kikuyus always sit on the land and the only problem is at the end 
of 5 years. It is all politics. Land is just an excuse” (Commission of Inquiry on Post Election 
Violence, 2008). 
6
 RePEAT is funded by GRIPS’s 21st Century COE and Global COE projects (Yamano et al., 
2005)  Questionnaires and other detailed information can be obtained at 
http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~21coe/j/index.html. The data are available for research purposes. 
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and poverty in Kenya. Nonetheless, the 2004 survey asked a relevant question on 
whether sample households were concerned about future land conflicts. This and related 
issues with land conflicts were analyzed in Yamano and Deininger (2009).  
In March 2009, about 15 months after the onset of PEV, we resurveyed all 
sample households in Rift Valley Province, where the violence occurred most 
prevalently, and sample households in two districts in the adjacent Nyanza Province for 
comparison. We have also traced households that had been displaced by the PEV and 
were living away from their original places due to the PEV. The five districts surveyed 
in March 2009 are the following: Nakuru, Nandi, and Narok in Rift Valley Province, 
and Kisii and Nyamira in Nyanza Province. Although households in Nyanza were 
included in the survey for comparison to the households in Rift Valley Province, 
violence was experienced in Nyanza Province, too, as we discuss in the following 
sections. At the same time, not all the households were affected by the PEV even in Rift 
Valley Province. There is heterogeneity regarding the scale of damage among districts 
as well as among households within a district.  
 Table 2 shows that ethnic compositions of sampled households. To highlight 
the relationship between the ethnic and political affiliation, the ethnic groups are 
ordered in such a way that the leftmost is the group that supported Kibaki most in the 
presidential election. In Nakuru, 75 percent of the sampled households are Kikuyu who 
supported Kibaki and 18 percent are Kalenjin who supported Odinga. As we have 
already discussed, clashes had occurred between the two ethnic groups in Nakuru 
District in the past. However, households from the two ethnic groups do not necessarily 
live in the same community. In our sample, too, it is rather rare to see more than one 
ethnicity in a community. Therefore, it is more realistic to think of this mix of ethnicity 
in Nakuru as a mix of different ethnic communities in the district. In the other two 
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districts in the Rift Valley, there are more than one ethnic group that supported the same 
candidate but to different degrees. In Nandi District, Kalenjin who mainly supported 
Odinga live with Luhya who partly supported him. In Narok District, Kikuyu who 
supported Kibaki live with Maasai who partly supported him. Thus, in all three districts, 
there are multiple ethnic groups, but the kind and degree of political affiliation are 
different from district to district, making the task of measuring the degree of political 
confrontation difficult.  
One of the appropriate measures of political confrontation may be the 
percentage of votes gained by each candidate in each district in the 2007 presidential 
election. The previous studies have argued that violence is more likely to happen in 
close contests because close contests increase absolute numbers of unsatisfied voters, 
and therefore easier to enlist militiamen to fight for their cause (Collier, 2006). In fact, 
at the national level, the 2007 presidential election was a close contest, as shown in 
Appendix Table A2. On the other hand, however, that, we know that a higher level of 
violence occurred toward Kiabki supporters from newspaper articles and reports. This 
may suggest that the larger the difference between percentages of votes gained by 
President Kibaki and candidate Odinga, the higher the sense of political confrontation 
between the peoples within the district, and the higher the probability that violence 
occur as a result. Thus, to test the hypothesis, we estimate the relationship between the 
voting difference and the probability of the violence in the regression models.  
At the local constituency level, Weis (2008) reports the official results of the 
2007 presidential election. By using the data, we match each of our sample communities 
with the nearest constituency and take the difference between the percentage vote 
gained by president Kibaki and by candidate Odinga:  
  
Odinga
i
Kibaki
ii SSGap
ˆˆ  .  
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By using this figure, we measure the degree of political confrontation in each sample 
community. In other words, if this figure is a positive number, then it means that 
community i supported president Kibaki, and if it is a negative number, then it means 
that district i supported candidate Odinga. In Table 1, we present the results from the 
above calculations for each district. In Nakuru District where there is a large Kikuyu 
population, Kibaki has 51 percentage points above candidate Odinga. In other districts, 
except Nyamira, Odinga won more votes than Kibaki. The differences are especially 
large in Nandi and Narok at 71 and 34 percentage points respectively. In Kisii and 
Nyamira, the differences are much smaller.  
Table 2 shows the proportion of household members that were directed affected 
by the PEV: 11 percent of male members and 9 percent of female members answered to 
have been victims. Noteworthy is that 18 percent of men in Nakuru district answered to 
have experienced violence during the PEV. One feature of this particular PEV is that 
even in Kisii, Nyanza Province, where incidence of violence were few and apart in the 
past, 7 percent of men and 5 percent of women were victims of violence. This suggests 
the sheer scale of the PEV.  
As for displacement, 23 percent of households in Nakuru District were 
displaced. In other places, only 1 household was displaced in Nandi District. Of the 33 
households that were displaced, 13 of them took refuge in relatives’ homes, eight in 
rented houses, five in own houses in other locations, four in housing or camps provided 
by the government, and three in other places. Furthermore, eleven households have not 
yet returned to their original home as of March 2009, or 15 months after the violence. 
As we have already discussed in previous section, Nakuru District is the area where 
land related conflicts had occurred in the past. 
Among our samples, 22.5 percent of sampled households hosted at least one 
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displaced person since the 2007 PEV. The average hosting period is 17.2 
person-months for the entire sample. The person-months is calculated by adding total 
months of all IDPs who stayed at the hosts. The average person-months is over 26 
person-months in Nakuru District, where the proportion of hosting household is the 
largest at 26 percent. As for the relationship of the hosted person to the hosting 
household head, 42 percent is own relative, 10 percent is wife’s relative, 14 percent is 
other relatives, and 34 percent is non-relative. In the two districts in Nyanza Province, 
around 20 percent of households also hosted IDPs. Since we did not find any displaced 
households in our sample in Nyanza, we speculate that the reason for the high 
proportion of hosting households in Nyanza is that they accommodated people who 
fled from the neighboring Rift Valley areas.   
 
4. Hypotheses and Estimation Models  
4.1 Hypotheses on the Causes of Violence  
As we have discussed in the previous section, there are several hypotheses on 
the root causes of the post-election violence. In this paper, we classify them into three 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Random violence toward specific ethnic groups 
Hypothesis 2: Violence driven by the land issues 
Hypothesis 3: Opportunistic criminal activities  
If Hypothesis 1 explains the root cause of the violence, we should find that our 
respondents from certain ethnic groups have a higher probability of experiencing 
violence regardless of their characteristics, except for basic observables such as age and 
gender. Human Rights Watch (2008) reports that people were attacked by a mob after 
showing their IDs and being identified as members of targeted ethnic groups. 
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Hypothesis 1 is consistent with such violence. If such ethnic antipathy is the root cause, 
then people from the targeted ethnic groups who live close to urban areas, where 
political activities are more active, may be more likely to experience violence than 
people who live in remote rural areas. For instance, political activists who gather at 
offices in cities or towns may get violently excited, participating in a political rally or 
watching TV news, and engage in violent activities. The political offices may hold 
machetes and other tools that could be used as weapons. In contrast, however, it could 
be safer for mobs to engage in violent activities in remote hidden areas that are far away 
from the eyes of the police and other outsiders. Deininger (2003) find, for instance, that 
the probability of violence is higher in remote rural areas than rural areas that are close 
to urban areas. In either case, under Hypothesis 1, factors that affect the violence 
include the degree of political confrontation, ethnic identity, household locations, and 
basic observable characteristics, but not household wealth, land rights, or land size. 
 If Hypothesis 2 explains the root cause, on the other hand, factors that are 
related to land holdings affect violence, in addition to the factors that affect violence 
under Hypothesis 1. The ownership of official land titles is especially relevant as it may 
help temporarily displaced people reclaim their land after returning to their home. If 
they do not own official land titles, it would be difficult to assert their land rights in 
communities that are hostile to them. Kenya has one of the most advanced land titling 
programs in Sub Saharan Africa. Yamano et al. (2009), for instance, find that their 
sample households have land titles on 72 percent of their plots in Central and Western 
Kenya. There are, however, those households who do not own land titles and are afraid 
of eviction in Kenya. Yamano and Deininger (2009), who studied the 2004 survey data 
that are part of our panel data, find that about 10 percent of the land conflicts were over 
eviction and use rights, which are more likely to be related to ethnic conflicts. The 
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remaining 90 percent of the land conflicts were about boundaries, inheritance, and land 
sales. These conflicts were mostly among neighbors and relatives, mostly within same 
ethnic group. Therefore, in this paper, we create two dummy variables: one for 
households who concerned about land conflicts over eviction or use rights at the time  
of the 2004 survey and another for households who concern about land conflicts over 
boundaries, inheritance, and land sales. In addition to these variables, we also include 
variables on land size and years of settlement. If Hypothesis 2 is the main root cause, 
then these land-related variables should have a strong influence on the violence.  
 Lastly, if the post-election violence was simply conducted by opportunistic 
criminals, then the mobs would have targeted wealthy households. The mobs may use 
factors that are related to Hypothesis 1 and 2 to cover-up their greedy objectives. Thus, 
we may still find the variables that are related to Hypothesis 1 and 2 significant. But in 
addition, we should find wealth-related variables to have a strong influence on the 
violence. 
Note that the estimation results in this paper may not give us a clear answer on 
the root causes of the violence. For instance, if all of the independent variables have 
significant impacts of the violence, we cannot exclude any of the three hypotheses 
above. However, by examining the results closely, we hope to be able to obtain a better 
understanding on the root causes of the violence and, hence, draw specific policy 
implications to prevent future violence. For instance, if the independent variables that 
are related to Hypothesis 3 are not statistically significant, we can eliminate this 
hypothesis. Similarly, if the land-related variables are not statistically significant, we 
can eliminate Hypothesis 2.   
 
4.2 Estimation Models  
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 To test these hypotheses, we estimate the following model on the probability of 
experiencing violence at the individual level:  
 ),,,()1Pr( ijijijijij HALPfv  , 
where ijv is a dummy variable of individual i , who is a member of household j, that 
takes one if the person has experienced any violence related to the PEV. ijP  is a set of 
variables that are related to political conflicts. ijL  is a set of land-related variables, 
and ijA is a set of variables, such as the total asset value and the per capita expenditure in 
2004, that indicate initial household wealth before the PEV. Finally, ijH is a set of basic 
individual and household characteristics that are not included in ijL , ijA , or ijH . If 
Hypothesis 1 is the root cause of the violence, then we should find ijP and ijH to be 
significant factors on the violence but not ijL  or ijA . If Hypothesis 2 is the root cause, 
then we should find ijL  to be significant factors, in addition to ijP and ijH . If Hypothesis 
3 is the root cause, then we should find ijA to be significant factors, in addition to all of 
the other factors.  
In addition to the determinants of the probability of experiencing violence 
during the PEV, we also investigate the determinants of internal displacement and 
hosting of IDPs. In the 2009 survey, we asked the respondents if their household had 
been internally displaced and, if yes, how many months they were displaced. We also 
asked the respondents to list any IDPs that their household hosted. On each of the 
hosted IDP, we asked about age, gender, relationship to the hosting household, and 
months he or she stayed at the household. From the list, we calculated the total 
person-months that the IDPs were hosted by the household. Thus, we use the months of 
the internal displacement by the household themselves and the total person-months of 
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hosting IDPs as two dependent variables. Because the 2009 survey was conducted 
approximately 15 months after the post-election violence, the dependent variables are 
doubly-bounded at zero and 15 months. Therefore, we estimate the following using 
double-bounded Tobit model:  
),,,(*
0
0*15*
15*15
ijijijijij
ijij
ij
ij
HALPfywhere
otherwise
yify
yif
y









 
The independent variables are as defined above.  
 
4.3 Variables 
 The set of variables on political conflicts include ethnicity dummy variables, 
the difference between the estimated percentage vote between President Kibaki and 
candidate Odinga at the community level, as we describe in Section 3.1. If this 
difference is positive, it suggests that the community supports President Kibaki. 
Because Table 4 shows that districts that voted for Kibaki have high percentages of 
victims, we expect to find a positive coefficient on this variable. It is not clear, however, 
if it remains positive and statistically significant after controlling for other variables, 
such as ethnic dummies. If it remains positive and statistically significant, then it 
suggests that among people who have similar characteristics, such as ethnicity, those in 
areas that supported President Kibaki are more likely to experience violence. In addition 
to these variables, we also include the average distance to the nearest two towns, 
measured at the household level, as an indicator to distance to the political offices in 
towns. This variable is calculated using GPS information of the sample households and 
digitized road maps. As we discussed in the previous sub-section, it is an empirical 
question if violence tends to erupt in areas close to towns, where political offices are 
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located, or in remote areas that are hard to reach by police and outsiders.  
 The land-related variables include, as explained before, a dummy variable that 
takes one if the sample household owns land titles on any of their plots, a dummy 
variable that takes one if the sample household was concerned about future land 
conflicts in 2004 over eviction or use rights, and a dummy variable that indicate if the 
respondent was concerned abut a land conflict over boundaries, inheritance, and land 
sales. We also include the land size and the number of years that the sample households 
have lived in the area. If the root cause of the violence lies in the land issue, the most 
likely target would be new settlers who are not members of indigenous ethnic groups, 
are new to the areas, and do not have official land titles. To represent the household 
wealth, we use the per capita consumption and the number of cattle. The per capita 
consumption is obtained from the 2004 survey to represent the household wealth before 
the presidential election in 2007. If the violence was driven by purely opportunistic 
criminal motives, however, mobs may not have detailed wealth information about the 
victims. They may use some observable wealth indicators to decide on targets. Thus, we 
also include the number of cattle owned as an indicator of observable assets. Finally, we 
include age and education of the individuals in the models in estimating the 
determinants of the violence at the individual level.  
On the determinants of the displacement and hosting of displaced people at the 
household level, we include demographic variables (the number of male adults over 40 
years old, the number of male members below 40, the number of female adults over 40, 
and the number of female members below 40), the age of household head, and a dummy 
variable for female headed households.   
 
5. Results 
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 In Table 3, we present the results on the determinants of the violence at the 
individual level. First, we only include ethnic dummies to compare the results across 
ethnic groups. According to Table 3, Kikuyu people have about a 17 percentage point 
higher probability of being victimized than Karenjin people, who are the base group. 
Because President Kibaki is Kikuyu and the PEV was initially targeted the Kibaki 
supporters, and because Kikuyu people are minority settlers in Rift Valley, this result is 
as expected. What is not expected is that Luhya people have a 15.5 percentage point 
higher probability of being victimized than the Karenjin people. As we discuss in 
Section 2, about three quarter of the Luhya people as a whole ethnic group voted for 
Odinga. Thus, if the violence was driven purely by the results of the presidential 
election, Luhya should not be targeted at this high level. But they are also setters in the 
Rift Valley who had been targeted in past conflict, and the Luhya population is smaller 
than the Kikuyu population in Rift Valley. Thus, they might have been an easy target in 
this area.  
 Next, we add variables that are related to political confrontation, land issues, 
and household wealth, in addition to basic individual and household characteristics. The 
voting difference between President Kibaki and candidate Odinga is highly significant. 
The results suggest that the probability of the violence is higher in areas that supported 
President Kibaki, but as the difference becomes bigger, favoring for President Kibaki, 
the probability declines. According to the results, the peak of the violence is at the 10 
percentage point difference, favoring for Kibaki. Thus, the result is consistent with the 
view held by previous studies that violence occurs in close contests (Collier, 2006).  
Regarding the distance to urban centers, the probability is higher in remote 
areas: as the average distance to the nearest two town increases, the probability of being 
victimized increases. This suggests either that the Kikuyu and Luhya people live away 
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from towns or that the mobs conducted violence in remote areas to avoid the police, 
which is under the influence of the Kibaki administration.  
 On the land related variables, we find that the land title protects the potential 
victims. Individuals whose household owns land titles have a lower probability, 3.8 
percentage points, of becoming victims than individuals without land titles. This 
indicates that the PEV was targeted those people who do not have secure land titles. In 
addition, those who have been concerned over eviction or land use rights have a 3.1 
percentage point higher probability of being the victim than those who have not had 
such concerns. As expected, concerns over other reasons against relatives and neighbors 
are not related with the violence. Regarding household wealth, we do not find any 
evidence that wealth households were targeted: the per capita consumption level in 2004 
does not have any impacts on the violence nor does the number of cattle. Thus, the 
results show little support for the opportunistic crime hypothesis.  
 Next, we present the results on the determinants of the length of internal 
displacement in Table 4. Consistent with the results on the determinants of violence, the 
voting difference between the two candidates has a positive impact on the length of 
internal displacement. In the community that supported Kibaki, the respondents were 
internally displaced for a longer period than households in the community that 
supported Odinga. We also find that households with victims have a longer 
displacement period than those who do not have victims. Interestingly, we find that the 
ownership of the land title has a positive impact on the displacement. This may suggest 
that the households with land titles feel confident in reclaiming their land even if they 
flee. In contrast, those households who do not have land titles may feel insecure of 
leaving their land because it would be difficult for them to reclaim their land without 
land titles once they flee. As for household wealth, per capita consumption level affects 
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the length of displacement positively. The positive correlation between displacement 
and wealth may be due to the relative facility of being away from home longer rather 
than as a result of being chased away by looters.  
Regarding other variables, no variables except for per capita consumption have 
statistically significant impacts on the displacement. As we have seen in Table 2, the 
displacement mostly occurred in one district, Nakuru, among our samples. Thus, it 
seems that there is not much variation in the other variables between the displaced and 
the remaining households in Nakuru. As for the results on the determinants of the 
hosting internal displaced people, the results in Table 4 suggest that Kikuyu have hosted 
displaced people. This is understandable because Kikuyu people were attacked more 
than other ethnic groups, except for the Luhya. We do not include a dummy variable for 
Luhya in the model because the number of Luhya households is small in our sample and 
none of them hosted victims (some of them were internally displaced). 
 Because internally displaced people escaped away from the politically hot 
conflicts zones, we find that the households hosted displaced people in and out of the 
conflict areas. The voting difference and the distance variables, which are important 
determinants on the violence and displacement, have no impacts on the hosting. The 
results also indicate that richer households with older household heads have hosted 
displaced people. This is probably because hosting of displaced people incurs extra cost 
and possibly requires more patience and experience that only comes with age.       
 
6. Conclusion 
 Violence may erupt again in Kenya in the future. After two months of the PEV 
in 2008, Mr. Odinga, with other members of his party, joined the Kibaki government to 
form a joint government and are discussing the draft proposal for the New 
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Constitution.
7
 The results in this paper suggest that the land issue is one of the root 
causes and that people without land titles were more likely to be victimized by the PEV 
than those who have land titles. We suspect that the mobs who attacked the victims who 
do not have land titles were hoping to obtain land from the victims. The victims would 
have a hard time to reclaim the ownership of their land without the official land titles 
once they had been chased away by the mobs. Thus, to prevent future conflicts, the 
Kenyan government needs to solve the land issue first. As the results in this paper 
suggest, the land title is a strong tool to protect the property rights of the owners even in 
times of armed conflict. Thus, the government should further assure of the property 
rights of the land titles. As Yamano and Deininger (2009) shows, landholding 
households neglect updating land titles even after the deaths of the registered owners. 
The government should encourage land title holders to update them as necessary and 
non-holders to obtain new titles. However, the government should be careful not to 
create new conflicts by issuing land titles where disputes over land ownership are not 
settled. It may be a better idea to let regional offices that have more accurate 
information on the situations on ground to settle disputes over land ownership. 
 In addition, the degree of the land conflicts could be eased through land 
markets. As the land markets in Kenya are among the most active land markets in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Yamano et al., 2009). Thus, land sales and rental markets allow 
those who want to use land to have access to land without land disputes. It is not clear, 
however, if the land markets in Kenya still function effectively after the PEV. Land 
owners may have become reluctant selling or renting land after the PEV. This is an 
                                                   
7 In November 17, 2009, a committee of domestic and foreign experts submitted a new 
proposal for New Constitution. Although it is expected that the new proposal will 
transfer some power from the president to the prime minister, and from the central 
government to the regional offices (Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, 
2009), others worry that minority groups could be marginalized by the regional offices.   
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important research topic in the future, and the government should remove such fears 
from the land markets. 
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Table 1. Ethnicity of Sampled Households 
 
 
  
Province 
District 
Sample  
size 
Ethnicity 
 Voting 
Difference  
 (Gap)
1
 Kikuyu Maasai Kisii Luhya Kalenjin Other 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
 Number % % % % % % ％Point 
Rift Valley         
Nakuru 138 75  1 3 18 2 50.7 
Nandi 46    15 85  -71.3 
Narok 17 12 88     -34.4 
Nyanza         
Kisii 61   100    -7.2 
Nyamira 33   97 3   12.1 
Total 295 36 5 32 4 22 1  
Note:  The ethnic groups that had relatively strong support for President Kibaki are shown towards 
left, and those for candidate Odinga are shown towards right. 
1) 
Average figure. For estimation 
method, refer to the main text. The figure is a subtraction of percentage points that candidate Odinga 
gained from that gained by President Kibaki. Therefore, a positive number indicates support for 
Kibaki and a negative number shows support for Odinga. 
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Table 2. Percentage of Victimized Individual and Displaced Households  
 
 
Province 
District 
Victimized 
Individuals 
Displaced 
Households 
Hosting  
Households 
Internally Displaced 
Persons 
Male Female Percentage Period
1)
 Percentage Period
2)
 Ratio
4)
 Period
5)
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) 
 % % % Months % Months % Months 
Rift Valley         
Nakuru 18.4 17.8 23.2 7.5
3)
 26.0 26.5 15.2 5.4 
Nandi 2.4 1.9 2.2 15 9.5 6.9 3.7 2.9 
Narok 2.0 1.3 0 - 16.3 20.0 9.0 2.4 
Nyanza         
Kisii 7.2 5.0 0 - 22.6 4.3 5.0 2.0 
Nyamira 5.4 2.4 0 - 22.2 5.2 5.1 2.5 
Total 10.6 9.2 11.2 7.7 22.5 17.2 9.0 4.5 
Note: 
1) 
Average period of displacement among displaced households. 
2) 
Average period of hosting 
among hosting households. This figure is the person-month figure, i.e. if the household hosted 2 
people for 3 months, it is counted as 6 months. 
  3)
 Among 33 households that were displaced, 30% 
or 11 households still lived away from home as of March 2009 (15 months after the start of violence). 
The survey was conducted at their place of refuge.  
4)
 Ratio of internally displaced persons to 
sampled number of household members in the district shown as a percentage of the latter.   
5) 
Average period of internally displaced persons staying in the hosting households. 
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Table 3. Probability of Being a Victim of PEV (Probit Model) 
 
 (A) (B) 
Ethnic and Political Affiliation 
a
 
 
  
Kikuyu 0.174*** 0.108*** 
 (8.72) (5.67) 
Luhya 0.155*** 0.177*** 
 (4.51) (4.67) 
Kisii 0.047*** 0.413*** 
 (2.66) (7.23) 
Maasai -0.038 -0.030 
 (-1.20) (-1.43) 
Other 0.063 -0.040** 
 (1.07) (-2.04) 
 Nyanza Province (=1)  -0.172*** 
  (-7.74) 
 Voting Difference: Kibaki - Odinga 
b
 
率｜ 
 0.0329** 
    (2.42) 
 Voting Difference Squared  -0.166*** 
  (-9.04) 
Distance to nearest town (minutes)  0.615*** 
  (8.24) 
Distance to nearest town (squared)  -0.331*** 
  (-7.11) 
Land related variables (Lij)   
Land title (=1) 
c
  -0.038*** 
  (-3.49) 
Concerned over land use or eviction (=1) 
d
  0.0310* 
  (1.84) 
Concerned over other land dispute (=1) 
d
  -0.005 
  (-0.47) 
Owned land size (acre)  -0.001 
  (-0.92) 
 Years of settlement  0.000 
  (0.67) 
Household wealth variables (Aij)   
 Per capita consumption 
e
  -0.000 
  (-0.03) 
 Number of Cattle  -0.001 
  (-0.83) 
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Individual and household characteristics (Hij)   
Age   0.002** 
  (2.51) 
Age Squared  -0.000** 
  (-2.00) 
Female (=1)  -0.010 
  (-1.29) 
Years of schooling  -0.001 
  (-0.70) 
 Urban (=1)  0.053*** 
  (3.24) 
 Sample size 2,802 2,619 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * indicates significance level at 10 %. ** 
indicates significance level at 5 %. *** indicates significance level at 1 %. The coefficients 
represent the marginal changes in probability. 
a
 The base ethnic dummy is Kalenjin. 
b
 
“Voting difference” is the difference in proportion of votes gained by each candidate at the 
location level. 
c
 “Land title” dummy is 1 if at least one of the plots of land used by the 
household is titled. 
d
 “Concerned over land use or eviction” dummy takes 1 if the household 
head has ever been concerned about land dispute with non relatives regarding eviction or 
use rights. “Concerned over other land dispute” dummy takes 1 if the household head has 
ever been concerned about any other land dispute with non relatives or relatives. 
e
 “Per 
capita consumption” data is taken from 2004 survey, in US dollars.  
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Table 4. Length of Displacement and Hosting Periods (Tobit Model) 
 
 Period of 
Displacement 
Period of 
 Hosting 
 (A) (B) 
Ethnic and Political Affiliation (Pij) 
a
   
Kikuyu 2.963 -2.791 
 (0.50) (-0.34) 
 Other -3.767 -3.993 
 (-0.52) (-0.45) 
Nyanza Province (=1)  15.45 
  (1.22) 
Voting Difference 
b
 5.661 10.17 
 (0.99) (1.23) 
 Voting Difference Squared -20.27*** 32.52*** 
 (-2.62) (2.74) 
Distance to nearest town (minutes) 60.94 -20.33 
 (1.48) (-0.52) 
Distance to nearest town (squared) -34.17 15.52 
 (-1.26) (0.66) 
Household with at least one victim (=1) 16.65*** 6.625 
 (3.61) (1.15) 
Land related variables  (Lij)   
Land title (=1) 
c
 8.678* -11.67* 
 (1.73) (-1.82) 
Concerned over land use or eviction (=1) 
d
 2.190 9.992 
 (0.41) (1.17) 
Concerned over other land dispute (=1) 
d
 1.076 -1.207 
 (0.25) (-0.20) 
Owned land size （acre） -0.004 -0.330 
 (-0.01) (-0.64) 
 Years of settlement 0.103 -0.035 
 (0.83) (-0.23) 
Household wealth variables (Aij)   
 Per capita consumption 
e
 0.027** 0.053*** 
 (2.32) (3.46) 
 Number of Cattle -0.138 0.706 
 (-0.20) (0.96) 
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Individual and household characteristics (Hij)   
Number of Men:     aged 40 and over -4.307 0.987 
 (-0.78) (0.14) 
              aged less than 40 -0.832 -0.670 
 (-0.55) (-0.30) 
Number of Women:  aged 40 and over 0.410 -1.051 
 (0.10) (-0.15) 
              aged less than 40 0.250 1.030 
 (0.17) (0.45) 
Age of household head -0.044 0.461** 
 (-0.27) (2.00) 
 Female headed household (=1) -1.213 4.864 
 (-0.22) (0.63) 
Constant -47.16** -56.22** 
 (-2.41) (-2.39) 
Sample size 190 270 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. * indicates significance level at 10 %. ** 
indicates significance level at 5 %. *** indicates significance level at 1 %. The coefficients 
represent the marginal changes in probability. 
a
 The base ethnic dummy is Kalenjin. 
b
 
“Voting difference” is the difference in proportion of votes gained by each candidate at the 
location level. 
c
 “Land title” dummy is 1 if at least one of the plots of land used by the 
household is titled. 
d
 “Concerned over land use or eviction” dummy takes 1 if the household 
head has ever been concerned about land dispute with non relatives regarding eviction or 
use rights. “Concerned over other land dispute” dummy takes 1 if the household head has 
ever been concerned about any other land dispute with non relatives or relatives. 
e
 “Per 
capita consumption” data is taken from 2004 survey, in US dollars.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table A1. 2007 Presidential Election:  Exit Poll and ECK Results 
 
 
 
Ethnicity 
Main Candidates Percentage of total 
voters  
 
Kibaki 
(Kikuyu) 
Odinga 
(Luo) 
Musyoka 
 (Kamba) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
 % % % % 
Exit Poll     
Kikuyu 94.2 4.1 1.7 23.1 
Luo 1.7 97.8 0.4 12.8 
Kamba 10.1 3.8 86.1 10.0 
Luhya 23.4 74.7 1.9 12.8 
Kalenjin 9.3 88.0 2.7 10.0 
Kisii 40.4 57.0 2.6 6.4 
Mijikenda 23.7 72.0 4.3 3.9 
Maasai 41.6 56.0 2.0 1.9 
Meru 88.0 5.8 6.2 4.8 
Total 40.2 46.1 10.2 100 
     
ECK Result     
Total 46.4 44.1 8.9  
Source: Gilson and Long [2009]. 
Note: Sample size for the exit poll is 5,495. Multi-stage cluster sampling proportionate to population 
size is used with random selection of polling centers and respondents. 
 
GRIPS Policy Research Center                                  Discussion Paper: 10-20 
 
 - 34 - 
Appendix Table A2. Characteristics of Sampled Districts and Causes of Past Conflicts 
 
 
 Province 
District 
Percentage of 
alienated land 
Causes of Past Conflicts 
(A) (B) 
 %  
Rift Valley   
  Nakuru 59.0 
1991-92,96-97: conflict between Kalenjin community 
and immigrants (Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo, Luhya and Kamba). 
Over 1500 people killed, 300,000 displaced.  Many 
non-Kalenjin that were displaced from Molo and 
Olenguruone in 1991-2 have not returned to the farms by 
1999.  Some have sold or leased the farms to the 
Kalenjin.  The clashes in Njoro were also on the farms. 
  Nandi 23.9 
1991-92: the Nandi against other tribes. Deaths, 
displacement. One of the earlier examples is the clashes 
over the land titles on Mitetei Farm. The majority of 
non-Nandi (non-Kalenjin) shareholders claim to have 
been driven out before land titles were officially given to 
the remaining shareholders most of whom were of Nandi 
origin.  Other clashes were reported to be mainly 
politically motivated by KANU leaders. 
  Narok 39.0 
1991, 93, 97, 2001: dispute between Maasai and 
Kisii/Kikuyu tribes over grazing/agricultural land. Over 
50 people killed, 30,000 displaced. 
Nyanza   
 Kisii 0 None 
Source:  Kimenyi and Ndung’u (2005), Akiwumi Judicial Commission of Inquiry on Tribal Clashes 
(1999) 
